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ALEXANDER HANILTON'S MARKET BASED DEBT REDUCTION PLAN 
ABSTRACT 
In 1790,  Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the 
Treasury of the United States, initiated a program to refund the 
U.S. debt.  Debt that had sold at 75% discount two years earlier 
would be refunded at par into new funded debt of the new federal 
government,  All foreign indebtedness  would be repaid.  I present 
evidence that Hamilton's actual refunding policy did not differ 
in nature from that envisioned under the recent Brady plan.  I 
will show that the bond package for which the old debt exchanged 
had a  market value well below par.  Thus, a large part of the 
face value of the debt was effectively  written of  f.  I compare 
the Hamilton restructuring package to the recent Mexican 
restructuring package to find points  of similarity to the Brady 
plan. 
Peter M. Garber 
Department of Economics 
Box B 
Brown University 
Providence, RI  02912 In  1790,  Alexander  Hamilton,  the  frost  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury of the United States, initiated a program to refund the 
U.S.  debt  incurred  by  the  Continental  Congress  during  the 
Revolutionary  War  end  the  interregnum  of  the  Articles  of 
Confederation. Debt  that had sold at 75% discount two years earlier 
would be refunded at par into new funded debt of the new federal 
government.  All foreign indebtedness would be repaid. 
The episode is remarkaole for Hamilton's impassioned defence 
of the principle of payment in full  of all sovereign obligations, 
even those of a predecessor State.  It rs 'Jet. sure  remarkable in 
comparison with the prescriptions by the current Secretary of the 
Treasury  for  dealing with  the  sovereign deot  problems  of  less 
developed countries.  Under the Brady  plan, part of the large bank 
debt  of  such  countries  would  be  eliminated  with  voluntary 
conversions into more  senior  claims with  reduced par  value  or 
coupon interest payments.  Thus,  Hamilton's absolute prescription 
of full repayment of sovereign debt seems to hve  crumbled in more 
pragmatic hands. 
Notwithstanding this oppearanue,  I will present evidence that 
Hamilton's actual refunding policy did rot differ in nature from 
that envisioned under the Brady plan.  After the initial refunding 
package, of course, Hamilton's principles traditionally ruled U.S. 
finance; and to emphasize that hardly any contingency could shake 
the  repayment  directive,  I  will  present  an  example  of  debt 
repayment  during the War of 1812.  I will,  however, dwell mainly on discussing the nature of the U.S. debt prior to the Funding Act of 
August, 1790,  and the means by which it was  refunded.  I will show 
that,  though the old debt wss indeed  exchanged at par for a package 
of new securities, the package had a market value wall below par. 
Thus,  a large part of the  face  value of the  debt  was  affectively 
written off.  I  will  then briefly  compare  the  Hamilton  restruc- 
turing package  to the recant Mexican restructuring  package  to find 
points of similarity  to the Brady plan. 
1.  The  Situation in 1790  and Homilton's Argument for  Repayment 
During  the  Revolutionary  War  and  under  the  Articles  of 
Confederation,  Congress  lacked the power to tax to raise  revenues. 
It  had to depend  on  revenue quotas  imposed  on  the states,  but it 
had  no  enforcement power if a  otaue  did not  meet its quote.  Aside 
from debt issue,  its  only other  source  of revenue was  the sale of 
lard.  Ao  a result,  the Congress  had hardly enough revenue to pay 
the  operating  cost  of  a  minimal  government;  and  it  could  not 
service the  debt,  amounting  to  31%  of national income,  cumulated 
during the  war and  its aftermath.' 
The  untenability  of the financial  situation of  the national 
government  provided one  impetus  for  the Constitutional Convention 
of 1787.  The new government,  armed with a tax authority, began its 
operation  in  1789.  In  1790,  the  Congress  imposed  tariffs  and 
excise taxes sufficient to operate the government,  to pay interest 
gn  some  debt,  and to provide  for the establishment and  funding of 
1  This  is  the estimate of  Barro  (1987),  p.  373. a sinking fund intended ultlmately to eliminate any class of debt 
defined  as  funded  debt.2  Wh all  these  measures  might  be 
expected to have  had  a positive impact  on the market value of the 
outstanding debt,  there  was  no  direct  provision for the servicing 
of this unfunded debt. 
Nevertheless,  Hamilton was adamant that the  debt  should be 
repaid because he believed that it was  vital to a nation's survival 
to avoid a reputation for default.  As Washington's aide-de—camp 
during  the  Revolutionary  War,  Hamilton  had  witnessed  the  near 
dissolution of the army at crucial moments because lack of credit 
prevented  the  acquisition  of  supplies.  From  this  experience, 
Hamilton learned that credit was a key weapon of war  that,  like 
other weapons, had to be prepared in time of peace.3  Throughout 
his voluminous  writings on the public  debt,  the fostering of credit 
for war is the most important reason that he presents in arguing 
for debt  repayment.  For  example,  in the  Second Report  on the 
Public Credit  of  January, l79  ,  Hamilton stated, "There can be no 
time, no  state of things,  in  which Credit is not  essential to a 
Nation,  especially as long  as nations in general continue to use 
it, as  a resource in war. 
2  For a discussion of the sinking fund concept in the U.S. 
and Great  Britain, respectively,  see Calomiris (1989) and Bordo and 
White  (1990) 
For a recent discussion of the effects of recurrent  warfare 
on  the  desirability  of  repaying  sovereign  debt,  see  Grossman 
(1990) 
Second Report  on  Public Credit,  January  16,  1795,  The 
Papers of  Alexander  Hamilton, Vol.  XVIII,  January—July,  1795, 
p.125. This sentiment was echoed  even in newspapers  that opposed the 
full repayment of the debt,  For example, commenting on Hamilton's 
refunding  plan,  one  writer  states,  "The  consequences  of  a 
depreciated credit have  been  too  recently  felt to  need  a  very 
particular description.  War is  a complicanion of calamities  to the 
best appointed nation: To one destitute  of finences and credit, it 
is almost certain ruin. " 
2, aLApAl,psL  Financial Rectitude: Servipino the Louisiana Debt 
Asserting the  absolute necessity of debt  repayment, Hamilton 
argued that creditors  should be faithfully paid even  if they  were 
nationals of an enemy  country  in wartime: 
The  right  to  seise  &  confiscate  individual  property  in 
National Wars excludes all those cases where the individual derives  his title from the  enemy  sovereign or netion'  a  nation by  the 
very act of permitting the Citisen  of a foreign country to acquire 
property within  its territory. . .tecitly engages  to give protection 
and  security to that property. 
The servicing of the Louisiana Stock illustrates the intense 
desire of Hamilton and his successors strictly to maincein  the good 
credit  of the  United States.  This requirement stemmed from the 
near fatal emberassments of the Revolutionary War, and the need to 
avoid them in future conflicts. 
The Louisiana Six Percent Stock  was issued in 1804 to finance 
the payment of $11,250,000 to France for the Louisiana territory. 
"The Observer, No. XVII", Pennsyivenia gszette, February 
24,  1790. 
Second Report on Public Credit,  p.  122, 
S The bankers for thrs issue were Ho1e and Conpany of Amsterdam and 
Francis  Baring and Company sf I  nln;  and $E,2t9,iCQ  of the issue 
was  to  be  distributed  in  L;r.  n,  a'.n  tna  rest  distributed  in 
Amsterdam.7  The  proceeds  frors  Lne  ssae  were  delivered to  the 
French.  Table  1  indicates the Treasury's renords of the amounts of 
the issue  in  London  that  was eventaally  'Yiomestinated"  or  purchased 
by U.S.  residents. 
The possibility of a war between Greet Britain end the U.S. 
became serious in 1811,  and a large  amount of this issue  was sold 
back to  U.S.  residents in the newt  year and a half.  Even so, 
almost  $4 million of Looisiana  Stock  remained in London, 
In  the  War  of  1812,  the  U.S.  again  ewperienned  greet 
difficolties  in  borrowing. Though  it did ecgoire  substantial  funds 
by selling  6 peroent bonds at well below per, it also has to resort 
to some issues of circulating  Treasury  notes,  a praotioe that had 
been considered  poor financial  poaroy  since the  oroietion of the 
Continentals in  the  Revolution.  To  servtoe tne  $4  million in 
Louisiana Stock held in London reguired $24  ,ttt per year,  or a 
total of oboot $CGO,GCO during the two ani  one-half years of the 
war.  Even in the midst of this war, the Treasury felt it vitally 
necessary  to continue interest  payments  on its obligations  held by 
foreigners,  including those  tn  London.  Through  an  intensive 
British  naval blockade  and the burning of the Treasury boilding  in 
1814  by British troops,  the Treasury regularly remitted bills to 
See Record  Group  56 Genera].  Record  of the Department  of the 
Treasury,  Docoments about the Purchase of Louisiana. 
S Baring and Company to provide payment to the  British holders of 
U.S. debt.  Indeed,  when some of the hills were nor accepted  in 
1814,  the Secretary of the Treesury wrote to Baring and Compeny, 
The  non—eooeptenoe  of  the  bills  as  announoed  in your 
oommunioation of 8th October would at any  time afford oause for 
regret,  but when it is oonsidered  that  this rircumstance is in some 
measure indioetive of the fate of a much large remittance made to 
you on the 23d  August, I am apprehensive  that unless you shall have 
interposed your  good offioes on the  0000asion  by advanoing  the 
funds reguired to disoharge the dividends on the Louisiana  Stook 
payable on the first instanoe, the  oredit of the United States in 
Europe will be materially affected  by the failure.' 
3. Refunding the Foreign and Domestic Debts 
The Debt in 1790 
In his Report on Public Credit  of January  9,  1790,  Hamilton 
estimated the debt of the United States  cc in Tables 2, 3, and 49 
In addition, Hamilton estiosted rhe  debt of the  states at about 
$2f.6  million.  This was relevenr  bereuse of Hamilton's intention 
to have the Federal government aesune the state debt. 
Letter from Treasury Secretary A.J. Dallas to Baring and 
Company, January 11,  1815,  in  Letters  to Foreign Bankers, April 
28,  1803  to March 20, 1833,  Record  Group 58, General Reoords of the 
Department of the Treasury, U.S.  Hational Archives. 
These data on the domestro  and foreign debt ran be found in 
Schedules B, C, and 0 of the report  in American State Papers, Vol. 
5,  Finanoe, pp.  26—28 and in Datnight,  p.  20.  In oaloulating the 
dollar  value  of  the  prinoipel  of  the  French  loans,  Hamilton 
apparently used the exchange rate of  .1815  $/livre, the  relative 
specie values.  In converting the arrears to dollars, however, he 
apparently used the rate  .1851  $/livre  The exchange rate for the 
Dutch florin or guilder was  .4  S/flnrin. 
7 History of the U.S. Debt t  l90 
The bulk of the debo inherloed by rho new state was incurred 
in the  Revolutionary Mar  n  various  refundings  during  the 
1780's under the  Articles  of donfederation.  The  domestic  debt 
instruments  were defined in terms  of dollars, which typically meant 
Spanish milled dollars.'° 
The foreign debt was  denomrnated in terms of French  livres 
tournois or of Dutch guilders.  The value of the livre tournois 
depreciated rapidly in the  key period of refunding  from 1790—95 
with the introduction of the inflationary assignat." 
The Domestic Debt 
Inicial Funding of the War: The Continentals 
The Continental Congress, lacking a taxing power, funded  the 
initial phases of the war with the  emission of Continental money 
starting in 1775.  These notes bore  a promise of exchange  into 
Spanish milled dollars in :ur it  stallrrnts beginning in November, 
1789 and ending  in November, 1712.  Through 7S1, the face value of 
these emissions totalled $36. millon, 
The value  of the Continentals dprecratad  rapidly.  By the end 
of 1776,  they were discounted by SOs;  and by March, 1780, the rate 
'°  The  information  in  this  sectron  is  based  on  the  history  of 
the  debt  presented  in  DeKnight  (1900) 
Spanish milled dollars contained  376 grains of fine silver. 
Though those generally in circulation averaged about 372  grains. 
Hamilton's Mint Act of 1792 set the silver dollar at 371.25 grains 
of fine silver. 
12  See  White  (1990)  has  recently  describe  the  assignat 
depreciation.  For a general discussion of French finance in this 
period, see also Bordo and White (1990) 
8 of exchange was 40 Continentals to one silver dollar.  By the end 
of  1781,  the axohange  rate was  1000 Continentals to one  silver 
dollar; and  the  circulation of  this  ourranoy  had  substantially 
ended. 
In 1780,  an attempt was  made to atsort the old Continentals 
with a new emission  promising to pay Spanish milled dollars in 1786 
along with 5 percent annual interest.  The public oould exchange 
old  Continentals for the  new  issue at a  rate of forty  to  one, 
approximately the exchange rate between Continentals and silver at 
the time of the offer.  Bills of this new emission did not readily 
circulate as money;  and in  spite  of the promised  interest,  its 
market price in specie fell to 1/8 of its  face value. 
Other Domestic Debt Instruments 
In addition to the Continentals, Congress financed itself by 
issuing  various  other  debt  instruments.  These  included 
uertifiuates  issued  by  the  Regisrar  of  uhe  Treasury,  the 
Commissioners of Loans of the States,  the  Commissioners  for  the 
adjustment of accounts of the Quartermaster, Commissary,  Hospital, 
Clothing  and Marine Departments, the Paymaster  Deneral, and  the 
Commissioner of Army Aocuunts.  In addition,  interest on these 
certifioates had often been paid in further certificates known as 
"indents of interest". 
Hamilton  laboriously  oompiled  data  on  these  various 
instruments to compute the value of the domestic debt and arrears 
13  For a recent discussion of the Continental depreciation, 
see Calomiris  (1988) in his First Report on the Tudor Credit of 1790.  Particularly 
noteworthy are the Loan Off3ce certificates.  These  issues were 
entered at  specie value' in daermining  their contribution to the 
1790 debt.  Specie  value meant the value in terms of specie at the 
time of issue.  Since  the pre—Septeniber,  1777  issues were issued at 
par,  these are  entered in Table  3  ' tneir  face value.  Issues 
after March,  1778  ($59.8  mil1ijn on  face value)  were  severely 
discounted to a value of $5.15 million. 
The issues from September, 1777 to March, 1778 were sold at a 
discount, so their face value of $3.46 million is entered at the 
discounted value of $2.54 million.  Apparently, the new government 
intended to repay only the origanal market prire as principal and 
not the contractual face value.  Never'heiess, on the loans from 
this period,  interest  of  61  was  allowed to  accumulate  on  the 
initial face value.  This led to a complication in the conversion 
offer of 1790 holders of certoei:atea issued from September, 1777 
to March, 1778 were reluctant no rojage in the conversion, feeling 
that it disadvantaged them re1t1ve  '  other claimants. 
Since the arrears of in'we  n t in turn earn interest, 
the domestic debt  s underotoei  Sr o  rurrent viewpoint.11  For 
example, if the  arrears on the entire $o,00C,000 prinoipal  had 
started in 1782,  the  arrears would have cumuiated  an additional 
"  Using  the pseudonym Civis,  Hamilton stated that arrears of 
interest did  not bear interest until  they were funded on January 1, 
1791.  This policy continued for those certificates that were not 
converted.  See  Civis  to  Mercator  for  the  National  Gazette, 
September 11,  1792,  The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Volume XII, 
July-october, 1792. 
10 $1.37  million in interest  by 1790, at 6% interest.  This amounts to 
3.4% of the principal plus arrears of the domestic.debt.  Since the 
indebtedness  of  the  states  was  about  $26.6  million  including 
arrears,  an  understatement  cf  acrears  of  the  same  order  of 
magnitude would have occurred. 
The Foreicn Loans 
These loans were incurred during the wer by the Contintental 
Congress and after the war under the Articles of Confederation to 
fund  current  expenditures  of  the  government  and  to  refund 
previously incurred debt.  The French and Spanish loans and the 
Holland Loan of 1762 were war finance  operations, with the lenders 
acting from political snd not commercial  motivations. 
The successive Holland  loans  were  undertaken to cover U.S. 
expenses in Europe or to meet interest  payments  falling due  on 
previous foreign loans.  These loans  were commercially priced, and 
their sale generally entailed  a  4.58 commission to the bankers. 
The  terms  for  the  Holland  ben  of  1784  were  particularly 
burdensome,  with  the  commissions,  bonuses,  lotteries  and 
gratificetions raising the yield  to 6.65%.  Typically, these loens 
carried a S percent annual interest  peyment.  The maturities of the 
Holland  loans  generally  were  from ten  to  fifteen  years,  with 
redemption to occur with severel eguel annual installments usually 
spread over five years.  Thus,  mccc principel on the Holland loans 
was due in the mid— to late 1790's. 
The French loans, made between 1777 end 1782,  had maturities 
that reguired repayment from 1785 to 1795.  On several issues the 
11 U.S. failed to make timely payment on bth  interest and principal, 
and the foreign loans undertaken  by the new  government starting in 
1790 were aimed  primarily at gain000 funds to cy  off these earlier 
loans.  The  $6.3 million worth of French loans represented 60% of 
the foreign debt and generated almost  all the arrears.  The French 
loans plus  arrears also amounted to  14s  of the debt of the U.S. 
national government in 1790. 
In 1787,  1788,  and 1789,  the U.S. missed scheduled principal 
repayments totalling  7.5  million lfvres  ($1,388,888) on the  18 
million and 10 million livre French loans, as well as the arrears 
of interest.  Hamilton did not allow for any interact payments on 
the arrears of interest, so arrears  effectively constituted a free 
loan to the U.S  If arrears of interest had paId the  5% annual 
interest standard in these contracts,  the US. foreign indebtedness 
on January 1,  1790 would have increased by $285,810, 2.3% of the 
total.  These arrears continued for severol years after the passage 
of the funding act of 1790. 
Refunding the Domestic Debt 
Hamilton's proposal in the First Report on the Public Credit 
to  refund  the  domestic  debt  at  par  generated  a  major  public 
debate.15  Since  much  of the  ectsting debt  had  been  resold  by 
initial holders at heavy discount,  many argued that only the debt 
The proposals to fund tna foregn debt apparently raised 
little controversy.  In  the Frst  Report on Public Credit  (Hocks, 
Volume 3,  p.  7) ,  Hamilton clairceci  that  there  was general agreement 
on paying the foreign debt on the precise terms of the contracts. 
12 still  held by the initial holder should  he redeemed at par, while 
debt which had been sold on secondary  markets  (to speculators and 
foreigners) should be redeemed at some market price26  Hamilton 
rejected  this  argument  as proposing  a  breach  of  contract  and 
insisted that all holders of debt be treated egually 
. ' He  later 
claimed the in any case there was  never more that  $3 million of 
U.S.  debt  floating  in  the  stock  markets  and  that  it  was 
guestionable whether as much as one—third of the debt was in the 
hands  of  "elienees" when  Congress began  to  deliberate  on  the 
Funding Act of 179C." 
Coincident with the  formation  of the new government in 1789, 
the First Report on the Public Credit in January,  1790,  and its 
implementation in the  Funding  Act  of August,  1799,  the  market 
values of U.S. domestic debt and state  debts rose dramatically. 
Table 6 presents  a  series of market prices for  Continental 
Certificates and indents prior tu and after the refunding offer. 
The  certificates were  "indented to  December  31,  1787,"  so they 
carried  arrears  frnm  that  date.  In  January,  1788,  both 
certificates and arrears  carried bids  of $11.67  per  $190.  By 
16  For  example the Pennsylvania Cazette of January  13,  1790 
argued for payment at market  value.  It invoked the  widows  and 
orphans of soldiers who had sold their  claims  below par and whom it 
would then be unjust to tax at high levels to redeem the claims of 
speculators at par.  The Pennsylvania Jazette of January 27,  1790 
also cites the Hew York Daily gazette  as being in opposition to the 
refunding proposal. 
Works, Vol. 3,  p.  8. 
18  "The  Vindication,  Ho.  IV",  Collected Hrrka  of Alexander 
Hamilton, Vol. XI,  February-Juna, 1792. 
13 
I April,  1789,  certificates  rose to  $23.33  and  indents  rose  to 
$15.00.  Throughout  1789,  certificate  prices  rose  steadily, 
reaching  $35  at the promulgatIon of the First  Report of Public 
Credit in January, 1790.  Indent  prices  simultaneously rose to $27. 
At the time certificates carried two  years arrears of interest, 
which, at the  current indent price would  be worth about  $3.00. 
Evidently, the  public in January,  1790 placed a 20% higher value on 
a dollar of principal claims than on a dollar of interest claims. 
At the time of the passage of the  refunding act in August, 1790, 
certificates  jumped  to  $52.50,  toeing  to  $o6.83  in  October. 
Indents rose suostantially less ro $33.33 in August, 1790 and to 
$35.42 in October.  in summary, the  series of every  establishing 
the new government and the passage f  acts to rube  FuJurl revenue 
and to  refund the debt mu  ltiploed the vaue of cebt prunripal  by 
five and  one—half times and  one value of interest arrears by  three 
times. 
The  Funding Act  passed  in August,  1790  provided  that  the 
domestic debt could be converted to new  issues of funded bonds. 
Three new types of bonds would be issoed: 6. coupon bonds, deferred 
6% coupon bonds, and 3% coupon bonds,  ail of  which paid interest 
quarterly.  The deferred 6% bonds  would ray no interest until 1800, 
after  which they would be identical  to the 6% coupon bonds.  The 6' 
and  deferred  6%  bonds  were  redeemable  at  the  option  of  the 
government;  but  the  sum  of  interest  payments  and  principal 
repayments in any one year could  not exceed $8 per $100 par value 
outstanding.  The 3% bonds were redeemable at any  time. 
14 The conversion  offer provided  that a certicate of $1 principal 
or par value  could he  converted  into  $1  of principal  in the  new 
bonds,  of  which 2/3  was  in the  6%  coupon bonds  and 1/3  was in the 
deferred  6%  coupon  bonds.  One  dollar in  interest  due  on  the 
domestic debt or in indents of interest  was convertible into $1 par 
vslue of the 3% bonds. 
Holders of the domestic debt had one yoer to subscribe to the 
new issues. The conversion  was not compulsory! and non—subscribers 
were promised that they would be paid  interost on the principal of 
their claims for 1791 as if they had subsoribed--6% on two-thirds 
of their principal2 
Market prices for the new hoods  are presented in Table 5.  The 
first data on new bond prices that I  have found after the beginning 
of  the conversion are for November 10,  1790.  On this date, the 
converted value of the $100 rinnipe1 of dooestic debt was $55.42. 
If all  of  the  outstanding  arrears were  still  attached  to  the 
original certificates, the typical $100 of debt would also  have 
carried $47.60 of interest arrears.  Converted into an eguel per 
value  of 3% bonds with  a price of  $35.42,  the  arrears  on  the 
hypothetical $100 certificate would have been worth $16.80. 
The principal value  plus arrears of $147.60 was then converted 
into a package of funded bonds worth $72.28 on November 10,  1790.20 
19  After 1791,  however, no further  provision was made to pay 
interest  to non-subscribers until  1795, when the subscription offer 
was reopened for one year. 
20  Hamilton himself stated thet et the time of the initial 
offer the package wee worth 573.  See Letter to Oeorge Neshington, 
August 18,  1792,  in The Papers of Alexander  Nemilton, Vol. XII, 
15 
4 Almost all the principal and arrears of the old debt was due and 
payable before 1791.  While Hanilton's schene did redeem  the old 
debt  'at  par" through the exchar.ge,  the  value of this converted 
package was only 49 cents on the dollar on November 10,  1790.  y 
January 1791,  the market value of the conversion package for this 
hypothetical certificate rose to $92.73 or 63 cents per dollar of 
principal plus arrears. 
In addition to the certificates,  provision was made to convert 
the Continental  bills of credit, $100 of Continentals being treated 
as $1 of specie principal in  the conversion.  Again, this could be 
subscribed for  a package consistiog of 2/3 sir percent bonds and 
1/3 deferred six percents with a  v auo  of $.55 on  November 10,  1790 
and  $.72 on January 1, 1791. 
The conversion package  for state debt ua slightly different. 
If  $100 principal  or  interest of  state debt  was  subscribed, the 
holder  would receive a  3%  coupon  bono win a fe value  of $3333. 
The remaining $66.67  would be  converted to  6  bond with  a face 
value of $44.44  (=4/9  x  $100)  and to a defarrej 6 bond with a face 
value  of  $22.22  (=2/9  x  $100).  The  value  of this  package  on 
November  10,  1790 was $48.76, and its value at the  beginning of 
1791 was $62.50 per $100.  When the conversion  of state debt was 
implemented  beginning  in  January  1792,  the  package  was  worth 
$90.73.  In the 1790 conversion  package, holders of the state debt 
were  offered a deal of about the same value as that offered to U.S. 
debt holders. 
July-October, 1792. 
16 Because  cf  the  natucs  cf  the  ccnversicn  offer  tc  state 
security holders, the market price  cf state debt after the cffer 
should have been less than the value cf the  conversion package. 
Harsilten estimated that $26.6 millinn cf state debt was eligible 
6cr conversion, but Congress authcrised only $21.5 million of new 
bcnds  6cr  the  ccnversicn  package fcc  state  debts.  Thus,  it 
provided for funding only  61%  of the state debt.  If all cf the 
state debt  had  been subscribed mr ccnversion, the  Funding Act 
prescribed that the conversion would proceed on a prc—reta basis, 
with $21.5 million of new bonds being exchanged for $26.5 million 
of the old.  Partial over—subscriptions  would be treated similerly. 
The authorized amount  of new bonds  was broken into quotas  by state, 
with  over-subscriptions  adjusted pro  rate  on  a  state by  state 
basis.  In the event, -all but  three states undersubscribed  the 
conversion, so $100 par value of old stete debt was swapped for 
$100  par value of the new bonds.  Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and 
South Carolina, however, oversubscribed their quotas by 12%, 72%, 
and  16%  respectively,  so  subscribers in these  states  received 
proportionally less in per  value of the new  bonds  for $100 par 
value of old bonds. 
For  comparison, from Table 6  the value  of North and  South 
Caroline debt,  which had been $10  per $100 of par value on Nay 22, 
1790,  rose  to $42.50  on December 4,  $62 by January 1,  1791,  and $70 
by August 3,  1791.  Table 7  presents the  values of the  various 
state debts on Nay 22,  1700. 
Though the conversion offer expired after 1791,  by January, 
17 1792,  $10.6  million of the eliaibe U.S.  domestic debt and arrears 
had not been  converted int tna funded debt.22  df this amount $6.8 
million was  in the furs.  regstered debt maonly  in tne hands  of 
foreigners.  Hamilton  claimed that these holders  wanted to convert 
to the funded debt  and had submitted extensive  subscrintion orders 
received  after the expiration of the offer  (and presumably after 
they  observed  the  rise n the  value  of  the  funded  issues) 
Hamilton  proposed  that  the  subscription  be  extended  though 
September, 1792,  and a sequence  of acts extended the subscription 
deadlines through the end of 1794.  Though no interest was paid on 
the bulk of the remaining unregistered and unfunded  debt,  there 
still  remained  $2.7  million  of  onfondJ  cio'  plus  arrears  on 
December  31,  1793  and  $1.2  million  ($176,000  registered)  of 
principal and $376,000 of arrears by December 31,  1794 
' See  "Loans,  January  23, 1392',  in Hamilton's  Wrks, pp. 286— 
296. Apparently, much of the rersining unfunded dent consisted of 
the Loan Office certificates issued between September,  1777 and 
March, 1778,  on which interest of had been promised on the face and 
not the specie value.  Hamilton stated that the promised interest 
then  ranged  from  6.2- to  1047-,  a  potential  yield  that  might 
discourage conversion, 
22  For  these data,  see "Report on an Account of Receipts and 
Expenditures of the United States  for the Year 1793",  The Papers of 
Alexander  Hamilton,  Vol.  XVII.  August—December,  1794,  pp.  554—563, 
Schedule  A  of  "Public  Credit,  17535',  American  State  Papers, 
Finance,  p.  339,  and  Schedule  of  a  Report  by  Oliver  Wolcott, 
December  31,  1795,  American State Raters,  Finance, p. 378. 
To provide for the elimina ion of the  last of the unfunded 
debt,  Hamilton proposed  in the  Second  Report  on Public Credit, 
January  16, 1795,  that the subscription  be reopened during  the year 
of  1795.  Loan Office issues bearing interest in nominal values 
would be paid  off  in specie principal  plus  arrears  of interest 
immediately.  For debt that remaIned unsuscrii  ad, prvcsion woold 
be made to pay the  interest due in  795  p_us  1/Ia  S  the  arrears. 
In  response to this offer, an anditional  $387,64 of princanal and 
arrears was subscribed  between January ann September, 1790, 
is Refunding the Foreign Debt:  The Payment of the Debt to Frence in 
the Assignet Depreciation 
In the  deliberations on the repeyment of the  13.5.  debt  in 
1790,  the foreign debt wee treeted cc senior to the domestic debt. 
While there wee greet oontroversy  oonoeroing tho rodemption value 
of domeetio debt,  there wee little dispute thet the foreign debt 
ehould be fully repeid.  Among Dhe foreign isenee, the florin debt 
inourred in  Amsterdam wee in feot treeted cc most senior; this debt 
wee  fully  serviced  even  in  the  period  of  the  Articles  of 
Confederation, end no peyment wee missed. 
23 
The debt to Frenre in livree  tournois wee not serviced under 
the Artiolee of Confederation.  Arrears of up to cix full years of 
intereet  paymente had cumulated by 1790,  end 7.5 million livree of 
eoheduled  principel  paymente (of 34  million livree  outetanding) had 
not been made. 
When  Hamilton reoeived authorieation to begin repaying  the 
French debt at the end of  1790,  he contracted a eeriee of bane 
23  Indeed,  the florin debt did not sell at a large dieoount 
relative to the bonde of other  countries.  At the start of a series 
of ealee of new refunding florin bonds  in Daoember, 1790,  Hamilton 
inguirad about the market prioee of  U.S.  debt in Ametardam.  His 
agent William Short roplied that 5%  U.S.  ooupon bonde  traded at 
prices between 99.5 and  100,  oomparad to 102.5 for bonds of the 
Emperor  (of Austria), 99 to 90.3 for  Russian bonds, and 90 to 97 
for Swedieh bonds.  Short also atataci  that maw 5% issues oould be 
marketed at par.  See Latter from  William Short, February 22, 1791, 
in The Pagers of Alexander Hamilton,  Volume VIII, February —July, 
1791.  For  comparison, Homer  (1977,  pp.  161—2)  lists British 3% 
console in 1790 at 76 7/S  for a yield of 3.90%. 
17 from Dutch bankers in florins.  The prcceeds frcm the loans were 
ccnverted  at  the  prevailing  euchange  rates  into  livres  and 
delivered  to  the  French  Treasury  from  Deceroer,  1790  through 
September, 1792. 
Simultaneous with the beginning of the U.S. debt repayment, 
the French  revolutionary government  began to fund itself  by issuing 
essignats,  which  were  made  el tender  in  payment  of  livre 
tournois  indebtedness.  The  U.  J.  agents in Paris  and Amsterdam 
responsible for contracting the coot issues  and movement of funds, 
guickly noting  that the U.S. game 
1  frIm the essignat depreciation, 
recommended that the U.S. accelerste  the payments of principal end 
arrears  on  the  French  debt  bLiore  the  French  terminated  the 
assignat inflation and redefineo the livce tournois.24 
Indeed,  payments of overdue urincipol and dnterest arrears  on 
the French  debt  were rapidly effectef starting in December,  1790. 
Table  8 presents  toe  schedule or livre payments  to the  French 
Treasury  made from the proceeds of the fiarin  loans, along with the 
flerio/livre exchange  rate  at the  tme  of  each  payment.  The 
24  In a letter to Hamilton dated June 3, 1791,  the U.S. agent 
William Short wrote,  'As the exchange is becoming every day more 
disadvantageous in proportion as the assignets depreciate, many of 
them suppose it as a speculation  ,  to hold back the payment as much 
as possible in order to take advantage of the depreciation. 
The depreciation of the assignats so long as they continue to 
be a circulating  medium is an advantage  to those who have debts to 
pay to France by remittances from abroad.  But this depreciation 
has been such for some time past as to give serious apprehensions 
that the time may come,  that ere long,  when it must be forced out 
of circulation. .  .  .  In  such en event  you will readily see the loss 
which the U.S. will sustain from not having extended to the utmost 
their  payments  under  current  circumstances."  The  Papers  of 
Alexander Hamilton, Vol.  IX,  Augsst-Secember, 1791,  Letter  from 
William Short,  June  3,  1791. 
20 exchange  rate  at  specie  values  of  the  currencies  was  .454 
florins/livre;  but  by Autumn,  1792,  it had  fallen to  .274,  a 
depreciation of  40%.  The nearly 30 million livres repaid during 
these two  years represented 68% of the  principal  and  cumulated 
arrears of interest at the end of  1796.  With these payments, all 
service payments on the French debt  had been brought up to date. 
The payments, undertaken at an average exchange rate of  .339 
florins/livre, had  a total dollar value  of $4,629,000.  If the 
payments had occurred as scheduled  at the pre—depreoiation exchange 
rate of  .454  florins/livre, their dollar  value vould  have been 
$5,393,751.  Thus,  delaying the repayment beyond the  contracted 
time had saved the U.S.  Treasury $1,364,751.  This meant that in 
dollar (specie)  terms, there was only a 75% repayment of a major 
part  (68%)  of the French debt. 
Hamilton,  however,  resolved not  to  take  advantage  of  the 
assignet depreciation.  In  a letter  to his agent, William Short, he 
wrote, 
"Hr. Ternant, shortly  afoer his srrivsl,  made a representation 
against the  payment of monies due  to France  in  its  depreciated 
paper or assignats.  You will readily conclude that the answer to 
such a representation could only be, that it was not the intention 
of the  United  States to take  advantage of the  circumstance  of 
depreciation, and thet an equitable allowance  would be made  for 
that circumstance in the  final adjustment of payments which shell 
have been made."25 
A correspondence  ensued  among  Hamilton,  Short,  and  Short's 
successor,  Governeur  Morris  about  the  form  of  the  "equitable 
allowance" to be made.  Finally, the interchange converged to an 
25  The  Papers of Alexander Hamilton,  Vol. IX, August—December, 
1791,  Letter to William Short, September 2,  1791,  p.  159. 
21 
I adjustment that would be determined aocordang  to movements  in the 
French price level so  that tha 9oods  v.1ue  if the final repayment 
would be held  fixed. 
It appears that no  "equlleble allowance" foc the  lacge  scale 
livre  payments of 1790-92 was ever made.  For the remnant of the 
debt,  however, either payments or conversions were undertaken at 
the  dollar/livre  specie exrhanga  rate  of  .1815.  For  example, 
Hamilton  agreed  to  deliver  suosuantial  inc  crest  and  principal 
payments due in 1793 and 1794 10 the Sum  5 dollar clams  on the 
U.S. Treasury at toe specie  enchange ra  .  These funds were used 
to  finance  par  bases  in  the  U.S.  by  tha  French  revolutionary 
government,  mou:,i  oods delaveredto  outfit Fcenrh exll ieions to 
guoll  unrest in Haai an the early  179o' 
By  the  end  of  17', he  balanca due on one bench  I  an, 11.15 
livres  tournois,  wo ,;'  o;.,ocuad  tOta  two  net;  issues  of  domestic 
(dollar denominatu1;  n 1  .  Iha balk of rhete honda,  $2 nillion in 
face value,  yieluel  5.5  csp n totes;  a  sm_il  portion,  $176,000, 
carried  4.5a  cuupuns.m  Too  tx_p  wss  unoertaken  at par  value, 
where the  dollar  par  valu  5  too  French  lebt  was  computed  by 
multiplying  the remaining prinu_pat  by  the speole  exchange rate of 
26  This disuussion  can  be  found  in a series  of  letters from 
Hamilton  to Short and Norris  dated September  2,  1791,  July  25, 
1792,  and Septemoer 13,  1792;  from Short to Hamilton dated June 3, 
1791,  November 8,  1791,  Novemoac 22,  1791,  and August  6,  1792. 
27  For an accounting of the 1794 payments, see "Public Credit, 
January 9,  1795",  American State Panars, Vol. 3, Finance, pp.  340— 
41. 
26  For a fescription  of these bonds, see DeRnight (1900),  pp. 
39—40. 
22 .1815.  The new dollar  bonds themsslvss sold at par, so this final 
portion of the Frenoh debt was redeemed fully. 
Thus,  the promise to pay off the French debt on an equitable 
basis applied only to the approximately 32% unpaid by the end of 
1792.  The other 68% of the  debt was paid at 75% of  its  specie 
value.  The average unit of French debt was therefore redeemed nt 
83% of its specie value.  Since interest lost on the many yenrs of 
cumulated  arrears was  not  added  to  the  debt,  the  Frenoh  lost 
approximately  an  additional  3%  on  the  delays  in  servicing. 
Altogether, only  about 80%  of the  French  loans were  repaid  in 
specie  value.  Nevertheless,  Hamilton  refused  to  tnke  tie 
opportunity  to pay  even  less. 
4.  The  Analogy  to  Current  Practice:  The  Mexican  Dank  Debt 
Restructuring 
The Mexican bank debt  restructuring provides  an example to 
compare  Hamilton's  debt reduction plan to the Brady plan,  mnnounoed 
in  March, 1989,  for restructuring debt using conditional  funding by 
third parties.  Under the Mexican plan,  $45.8 billion of Mexicen 
debt  to  banks  would  be  converted  into  new  securities.  The 
remainder of the Mexican  debt,  about  $55  billion,  consisted  of 
official credits, trade credits, and bond debt.29 
Banks had three options for converting the debt.  First, they 
could swap their $1 face value of bank debt for $.65 face value of 
a 30 year bond "Debt Reduction Bond" carrying en interest rate of 
29  These  date are from the Bulow end Rogoff  (1990) 
23 LIBOR plus 13/16.  Second,  they could swap $1  face value of bank 
debt for $1 of a 30 year "Debt  Service Redoctron B nd' carrying a 
fixed annual interest  rate  of  6.5%.  Finally,  any part  of the 
original bank loans not exchanged for these bonds would remain an 
obligation of the Mexican government, but  the  holders of these 
claims  had to lend new money to the Mewican government equal to 25% 
of the remaining bank loans over three years. 
To provide guaranteed repayment for  part of its obligations 
under the  Debt Roiuction  and Debt  Service Reduction  Bonds, the 
Mexican governmnt provided collateral of  $7  oillion.  This was 
partly converted inn  a  30-year '0S.  Treasury discount bond that 
covered the principal  payments,  with  the rt uaed to provide  a 
two-year rolling guarantee  on  interest payments.  Fonda for the $7 
billion  guarantee  were  advanced  mostly  from  the  IMF,  the  World 
Bank,  and  the  Japanese govrnoant;  and  these  loans  added  to the 
official obligati  n  f  inc  lIa::Lcan governmant. 
Of the $46.8 biilin eligible  for conversion,  banks  exchanged 
$22.8 billion at par  for  the Debt Service Reducti  n bonds and  $10.7 
billion for $12.1  billion of Debt Palcction Bonds.  Banks with $4.3 
billion of clair  optel to lend  nea money  of $1.1 billion over the 
next  three  years.  Effectively,  thio  arounted  to  relending  the 
interest on the remaining bank debt to MexIco. 
In April, 1990,  immediately after the conversion, the market 
prices of the Debt Service Reduction Bond and the Debt Reduction 
Bonds were 41.25 and 62.75, respectively.  Since $1 of bank debt 
bought $.65 of Debt Reduction Bonds, exchanging $100 of debt under 
24 this  option  was  worth  $40.75;  so  the  two  bond  options  were 
approxinstely equivalent.  The prire  of bsnk debt  wss $40 per 
doller 
30 
5.  Conolusion: Hamilton Compered to Brady 
The mechanics of the U.S. refunding of 1790 and the Mexirwn 
refunding  of  1990  are  similar  in  all  but  a  few  superficiel 
dimensions.  These similarities are presented in Teble 9. 
In both oases,  there were different seniorities  of debt, with 
different payoff rates.  In both oases, the most  senior foreign 
cleims were serviced according to rontrart with no interruptions. 
Both the U.S. and Mexico added to the senior debt to refund or poy 
off the more  junior debt.  In the U.S.  case,  however, deleyn in 
paying the principal and arrears of interest on the debt to Feoooe 
resulted in  a specie paymenc of only $80/dollar bersose of the 
subsequent mssignst depreciation. 
In the case of  the  more  jonior claims,  the U.S. offered oo 
exchange package worth $49 of U.S. debt and arrears in Movember, 
1790 and  $.€3 in  January,  1791.  The  initial exchange  pookoqo 
offered for state debt was worth 8.49/dollar in Movember, 1790 ood 
$.63 in January, 1791;  but  when  it  was  effected  in  1792,  price 
rises in the bonds increased the package's value to $91/dollar. 
The two bond deals offered in exchange for holders of Mexican bank 
debt had a value of about 8.41/dollar.  Thus, the initial value of 
the U.S. deal amounted to a discount from the face value of the 
30Salomon  Brothers, Indicative Prices for Developing Country 
Credits. 
25 debt  of  51% versus  591  for the Meorran deal. 
The  final  optoor  of  oinpiy'  rohawing  the  converaron  by 
retaining the original debt prerenos  so apparent dafferenre in the 
two  schemes.  The  Mexican dccl required additional  peymenta of "new 
money" from those electing this option.  Effertively, this means 
that little interest will  artually be paid on the  retained debt 
before 1993.  Thus,  there io ao elereno of involuntariness in the 
Mexican options.  Hamilton, on the other hand,  stressed that the 
exchange  had  to be voluntary.  Hevertheleas,  the  refunding  act 
provided only for the payment of interest for 1791,  the year of the 
conversion,  to  the  remaining  holders  of  the  old  debt.  Ho 
additional future  raru-rt  a  funir w  a offered fur paying off 
principal and cunuittu on"  ,  1  r'  Ho provision was 
made for  paynen  'r inture  '0  n;:r  'l,,t—'  ,e ira.  Thus,  the deal 
offered by  HamiJ an  wffecniveiy  roerreo  noiders  of  the  old  debt 
into  accepting  r"ro interest on  arrears  (1/3  of the  debt)  and  on 
1/3  of the prinoipal.  Also,  from the viewpoint of  1790,  the deal 
would possIbly  forre  further  cumulations of arrears after 1791. 
There is then little differen 'c between  Hamilton' a "voluntary" 
package  and  the Mexican  deal  unoer the  Brady plan.  Ex  post,  of 
course,  successive  U.S.  Serretarieo  of  the  Treasury  adherd 
rigorously to the contractual servicing arrangements f.r the U.S. 
debt; but  the below  par pricing  of the  Of bonds  in early  1791 
indicated that this outcome was  not certain in 1791.  The still 
greater discount  on the restructured  Mexican package indicates even 
greater skepticism that Mexioo will pay off its debt as agreed on 
20 paper.  Nevertheless, the  mechanics of these  restructuring packages 
are remarkably parallel. 
27 Table 1 
Amount  of  London  L  cicina Stock Dumeacicatad 
Year  Face Uaoce 
1805—10  215,000 
1811  1,199,000 
1812  1,036,000  (280,000  after July  1) 
1813  542,000 
1814  89,000 
1815  6,700 
1816  172,000 
1817  180,000 
1818  382,000 
Total  3,771,70 
Source: NO No.  53,  Bureau of the Public Debt,  Treasury Records, 
Volumes, 204,204A, 205.  U.S.  National Archives. 
28 Table 2 
Foreign Debt ant Arrears-—January 1,  1790 
Loan from Farmara—Deneral of Franra 
Frenrh loan of 18,000,000 liuras 
Loan from Spain in 1782 
French loan of 10,000,000 livres 
Holland Loan of 1782 
Frenrh loan of 6 million hares 
Holland loan of 1784 
Holland loan of 1787 
Holland loan of 1788 
Total Principal of 
Foreign loan 
Due France for military supplies 
Arrears of interest Jan.  1,  1790: 
Of Which: 
5 Years interest  $277,777 
on 6 Million Liarea 8  5% 
6  Years Interest on 18  999,999 
Million Livres @  5% 
4  Years  Interest  on  10  296,296 
Million  Liarea  @  4% 
Spanish Loan ——7  years  65,997 
Interest on $174,  000  8 
5% + Arrears  through 1782 















11,763,106 Table 3 
Domestic Debt (Dollar  tonominete;January  1,  1790 
I.  Principal of domestac deot  27,383,9l7.- 
Of Which: 
1. Registered debt  4,f98,4e2 
2. Certificates of  7,967,109 
Commissioner of Army 
Accounts 
3. Certificates of  903,374 
Commissioners of tne 
five departments 
4.  Certificates issued  3,/91,lOo 
by  State Cormisscner 
5.  Loan Office Cert:fiates  112,704 
——1781  (Specie veluo( 
6.  Loan office certificates 
(Specie valu( 
a.  Issued before 9/77  3,787,900 
b.  9/77 to 3/78  2,338,372 
($c,459, 000 Nooinal( 
c.  3/78 to end of Loan 3,146,330 
Office 
($3 ,  3  ,212 N minal 
7. Due Forri;n 9fficr  1  0,24. 
II. Arrears of intr9st  [r  uL c  U,  l7Jo 
Total Cumulatel Inn'recU  Sl/,9  ,48l 
1. Lean clfajc oUt  /cj34,4 3 
2. Army debt  T, :01,7a9 
3. CertlU  ;atec of  2,149,  79 
State C csrscUnerc 
4. Certifiates  of  737, -8 
Cormiraury, Quartermcster, 
Marine, Clothing and 
Horpital Departments 
5. Registered debt  335,C45 
6. Due Foreign Officers  11,183 
Less Previous Interest Payments  $4,944,127 
Total Arrears  $13,041,353 
31 The total is less than the individual components  because of 
a subtraction of $960,915 received "on err oct of lands and other 
property, cancelled" and a dedoctron of a "snecie  amount,  cancelled 
end registered" of $365,983.  (American  5tof- Peters, volume 3, p. 
27.)  There Was also a "sundries" category of $187,  578. 
32  The Report on Public Credit, written in January,  1790, 
presented estimates of the inteLest due and payable on each class 
of dDmestic loan to the end of 1790,  including arrears.  Since no 
interest Was paid during 1790,  thrs eat/mate represents the end of 
year arrears. 
3d Table 4 
Total Domesbic end Foreign Debb 
1. Foreign Debt  11,736,106 
Principal  10,098,705 
Arrears  1,640,069 
2.  Domestic Debt  40,425,270 
Principal  27,383,917 
Arrears  13,041,353 
Total  52,188,376. 
31 Table 5 
Market Prices for Bonds* 
(Dollars/$l00 Pr  Value) 
Date  6 Per Cent  Deferred  3 Per Cent 
1790 
November 3  70 
November 10  68.75  28.75  35.42 
December 4  70  32,5  37.08 
1791 
January 1  87.5  42.5  42.5 
February 2  86.25  45.4  45 
March 2  86.25  45.4  45 
April 2  85.8  45  45 
Nay 4  85.8  45.4  45.8 
June 1  85.8  45.8  46.5 
July 2  90  50 
August 3  102.5  65 
September 3  105.8  63.  21 
October 1  102.5  60.5 
November 2  107.5  66.25  61.2 
December 3  110.8  66.25  63,3c 
1792 
January 4  116.25  70.8  70 
February 1  127.5  77,5  76,66 
March 3  123.33  75  71.66 
April 4  105  62.5  60 
May 2  105  62.5  60.8 
June 2  112.5  68.75  66.66 
July 4  106.65  65  62.5 
August 1  106.66  65  62.5 
September 1  110  67.5  65 
October 3  110  67.31  65.42 
November 3  106.66  6n,2  'j.2 
December 1  106.25  66.25  '2. 
*Prices were reported in terms of shollings and pence to the pound. 
Sources:  Gazette  of  the  United  States,  various  issues,  November— 
December, 1790;  'Report on the State  of the Treasury at the Commencement 
of Each Quarter During the Years 1791 and 1792 and on the  State of the 
Market in Regard to the Prices of Stock During the Same Years, February 
19, 1793",  in The Papers  of Alexander Hamilton, Vol. XIV, February—June, 
5  1793,  pp.  123—127. 
32 Table 6 
Market Prices for Certificates, Indents  and State Securities* 
(Bids  in Dollars/$100 Par Value) 
Continental  State 
Date  Certificates*  Indents  Securities** 
1788 
January 19  11.66  11.66 
August 8  20 
November 14  20 
1789 
January 2  20.83  12.50 
April 10  23.33  15 
May 1  22.50  15 
June 5  23.75  15 
July 3  23.33  15 
August 7  20  15 
September 4  24.58  15 
October 2  25  15 
November 6  25.83  15 
December 4  32.50  17.5 
1790 
January 10  37.50  27.50 
February 5  35  25 
March 5  40  30 
April 9  35  27.50 
May 1  36.25  26.67  10 
June 4  40  3125 
July 2  41.67  32.50 
August 6  52.50  33.33 
September 3  58.75  33.75 
October 2  60.83  38.42  40 
November 5  60  34.17 
December 4  63.33  37.08  42.50 
1791 
January 1  75  42.50  62.50 
February 2  77.50  45.41  55 
March 5  78.75  45.42  62.50 
April 2  78.75  45  60.83 
May 7  80  45.42  61.66 
June 4  80.83  46.67  62.50 
July 2  85  50  65 
August 3  95  62.50  70 
October 5  92.50  52.50  —— 
November 5  90  55  —— 
December 3  97.50  57.50  —— 
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Continued 
Continental  Itate 
Date  Certifiate  Indnts  Suritze** 
1792 
January 4  102.5  65 
February 4  110  66.67 
March 3  110  70 
April 4  95  60 
May 2  92.50  61.25 
June 2  92.50  66.67 
*The Federal Gazette lists  'Continental Certificates Indented to 
December 31,  1787'.  I take this to mean that interest due through 
the  end  of  1787  had  been  paid  in  indents.  Therefore,  these 
cerfificates  carried cumulated  interest  from  the  beginning  of 
January, 1788. 
**The Gazette of the  United States, February 2,  1731,  dentifies 
these as securities of North and South Caroline. 
Sources: The observation for January ,  l7B wa tken Iron The 
Independent Gezeta.  0bservetons  frvn Au7356 1,  788 through 
September  3,  1790 n  Continental Ceriflcatez ani  Indents were 
taken from vaciou laues  of The FeHerl Gazett  -  The  remaining 
observations on Continental Certofica±'s and Indents and all  the 
observations on  tet Securities were tken from various issues of 
The Gazette of th  United Staaes. 
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Market Value of State Securities——May 22,  1790 
Dollars par $100 Far Value 
State  Prioe 
New Hampshire  17.50 
Massachusetts  1250 
Rhode Island  1.25 
Conneotiout  12.50 
New York  17.50 
Delaware  20.00 
Maryland  20.00 
virginia  18.00 
North Carolina  7.50 
South Carolina 1000 
Georgia  0.00 
Souroe: Gazette of the United Stetes. 
35 mble 8 
Payments on the  French Deto 1790—1792 
Date  Litre Tournois  Ficrins  Exchange Rate 
(Florins/Livre) 
1=.  434 in  Specie) 
12/3/90  3,611,950  1,300,014  .415 
6/10/91  2,696,629  1,003,000  .373 
8/11/91—  9,111,l  3,390,934  .372 
10/24/91 
11/10/91  1,34,909  367,823  .368 
12/15/91—  6,736,974  1,968,000  .291 
6/ 4/92 
9/  6/92  6,000,000  1,641,250  .274 
Total  29,717,639  10,073,043  .339 
Sources: American tete Pacers,  VA. u,  'Lcuns,  February 13,  1793, 
Schedule  A".  The  Peters  A ;ar3-c Hamilton,  Vol.  XIII, 
November, 1792—February, 1793,  Jncaty 3,  1/93,  Schedule A. 
36 Table  9 
TJ.5.  vs. Mexican Debt  Restructurings 
Payoffs on $1 of Debt 
U.S.  —1790  Nexico—l  990 
1. Senior  Debt  Dutch Loans to  1758-— 
100%  of service  payments  as  scheduled 
Dfficial Dcedits; 
Bonds——l00%  of service 
payments as scheduled 
French  Loans——Peid  off at 
5. 60/dollar 
2.  Junior  Debt  Domestic 
(Silver  $  Denomsnetad) 
Dank  Debt 
(5  Denominates) 
a.  Exchange  U.S.  —- Value  of bond  Debt Service——$.4l/ds  Jon 
Options  exchange packegs 6.49/dollar  Reduction 
in Nov.,  1790;  6.63 in 
Jan.,  1791 




17 92——s . 91/dollar 
b. Retain  Debt  Promise of interest Payment  for  1  year in 1791;  No 
provision  for principal  and 
cumulated arrears in future; 
No interest on  arrears 
Value  $49  in Nov. ,1790; 
$63  in  Jan.,  1791 
37 
Previous restructuringn 
had rolled interest into 
principal so no uumuleted 
arrears.  This  option 
formally convert interest 
to principal  for  3  more 
years.  Value  =  6.40 
Debt 
Reduction 
——S .41/duller References 
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